In this way the author deals with several aspects of social banditry and distinguishes three main types of bandits: the noble robber, the primitive resistance fighter, and the terror-bringing avenger. Whatever the differences among them, they have in common the fact that they voice popular discontent.
The approach leaves little room for a more comprehensive analysis over time of particular bandits or bands-accounts which are badly needed, as I hope to demonstrate presently. Where Hobsbawm embarks upon an extended case, the result cannot be else than sketchy (1969: 96-108). We should therefore read this study as the author asks us to in his Preface: as a postscript in essay form to Primitive Rebels. In this realm, Bandits seems an appreciable book, well written and elegantly edited, furnished with 62 illustrations most of which are quite fascinating.1 The reader is offered a necessarily selective panorama on no less than 90 different bandits, who form the raw material to illustrate the author's ideas on brigandage at large.
Yet it is precisely because the interpretations do not extend very much beyond those already contained in Primitive Rebels that the reader who is somewhat familiar with the subject will be slightly disappointed. Anxious to find additional evidence for his hypotheses, the author avoids discussing the many cases contradicting them. If, as Popper said, theories are nets cast to catch what we call 'the world'-to rationalize, to explain, and to master it-Hobsbawm does not seem particularly concerned to make the mesh ever finer and finer. It could hardly be otherwise, for he tells us that he entertains the hope that the new data will not conflict with his original model as sketched out in Primitive Rebels. And he adds: 'Still, the wider the generalization, the more likely it is that individual pecularities are 496 ANTON BLOK neglected' (1969: 11). One might wonder about the type of generalization that permits the neglect of particular cases, the more so since there were several questions in the first book which required thorough reconsideration.
It is my contention that there is much more to brigandage than just the fact that it may voice popular protest. Though Hobsbawm mentions several other aspects of banditry, his model fails to account for these complexities, and even obscures them, because he insists on the interpretation of new data in terms of his original model. This review attempts to explore the model of the social bandit as a special type of peasant protest and rebellion. I shall argue that the element of class conflict as embodied in certain forms of banditry has received undue emphasis. Rather than actual champions of the poor and the weak, bandits quite often terrorized those from whose very ranks they managed to rise, and thus helped to suppress them. The often ambiguous position of bandits may be understood when we appreciate the significance of the various links that tie the peasant community to the larger society. Likewise, the distinction between direct and constructed reference groups may help to explain why peasants and romanticists (including some of us) indulge in an idealized picture of the rural bandit as an avenger of social injustice, in spite of the obvious evidence to the contrary. The present discussion may contribute to a more adequate understanding of peasant mobilization and peasant movements. If we agree on political mobilization as a process through which people seek to acquire more control over the social conditions that shape their lives, it may be argued that bandits do not seem the appropriate agents to transform any organizational capacity among peasants into a politically effective force. Rather than promoting the articulation of peasant interests within a national context, bandits tend to obstruct or to deviate concerted peasant action. They may do so directly by means of physical violence and intimidation. In fact, we know that bandits have fulfilled pivotal roles in the demobilization of peasants. Indirectly, brigandage may impede large-scale peasant mobilization since it provides channels to move up in the social hierarchy, and thus tends to weaken class solidarity. In this paper, therefore, I shall focus on the interdependencies between lords, peasants, and bandits. The vignettes are mainly based on Sicilian material since my fieldwork experience has been restricted to this area.
To appreciate the importance and ubiquity of the social bandit, we should recognize which categories Hobsbawm excludes from this type. They involve all urban robbers, the urban equivalent of the peasant bandit as much as members of the so-called 'underworld'; rural desperadoes who are not peasants, e.g. the bandit gentry; raiders who form a community of their own, such as the Bedouin; mafia-like gangs; the landlord's bandits; and the classic blood-vengeance bandits (1969: 13-14) . This narrows to a considerable extent the universe of social brigandage.2 There are even further provisos, since not all categories necessarily exclude one another. Particular bandits may, either simultaneously or in the course of their careers, express popular discontent as well as the power of the landlord or the State (1959: 13). Furthermore, we know of outlaws and bandits who were glorified or, at least accepted, in their native districts while feared as raiders far outside of these areas. For example, the nineteenth-century Indian Thuggee (Thugs), who specialized in ritually strangling and robbing travellers, lived as ordinary peasants in their native areas where they were protected by local rulers with whom they shared the booty, but operated well over a hundred miles from their homes (MacKenzie, 1967: 64-6). As Barrington Moore has aptly said with respect to nineteenth-century China: 'It is necessary to be aware of romanticizing the robber as a friend of the poor, just as much as of accepting the official image. Characteristically the local inhabitants would bargain with the bandits in order to be left in peace. Quite often local gentry leaders were on cordial terms with bandits' (1968: 214) . 3 Hobsbawm is aware of these varieties and complexities, but he does not attempt to account for them. His prime interest is social protest: 'Though in practice social banditry cannot always be clearly separated from other kinds of banditry, this does not affect the fundamental analysis of the social bandit as a special type of peasant protest and rebellion' (1969: 33). However, when it is recognized that 'the crucial fact about the bandit's position is its ambiguity ... the more successful he is as a bandit, the more he is both a representative and champion of the poor and a part of the system of the rich' (1969: 76), we may question the heuristic value of his model of the social bandit with respect to brigandage at large. As Hobsbawm admits elsewhere, few bandits lived up to the role of popular hero. Yet, 'such is the need for heroes and champions, that if there are no real ones, unsuitable candidates are pressed into service. In real life most Robin Hoods were far from noble' (1969: 34). For instance, Schinderhannes, a famous bandit chief who operated in Rhineland in the late 1790s, 'was in no sense a social bandit but found it advantageous for his public relations to advertise that he robbed only Jews . .. ' (1959: 20) .
The point I want to make is not that 'social banditry' cannot be a useful sociological concept. This it certainly is, though in a much different way than Hobsbawm suggests. In a sense, all bandits are 'social' in so far as they, like all human beings, are linked to other people by various ties. We 2 We should remember that unsuccessful bandits are less likely to be recorded, for they do not live long enough to get widely known, let alone to reach the annals of history. Hobsbawm does not make clear whether or not this category belongs to his universe, since he does not mention it at all. cannot understand the behaviour of bandits without reference to other groups, classes, or networks with which bandits form specific configurations of interdependent individuals.4 What seems wrong with Hobsbawm's perception of brigandage is that it pays too much attention to the peasants and the bandits themselves. Before looking at them, it is necessary to look at the larger society in which peasant communities are contained. Without taking into account these higher levels, which include the landed gentry and the formal authorities, brigandage cannot be fully understood as indeed many particular characteristics of peasant communities are dependent upon or a reflex of the impact of the outside world. Given the specific conditions of outlawry, bandits have to rely very strongly on other people. It is important to appreciate that all outlaws and robbers require protection in order to operate as bandits and to survive at all. If they lack protection, they remain lonely wolves to be quickly dispatched, and those who hunt them down may be either the landlord's retainers, the police, or the peasants. Our task is therefore first to discover the people on whom the bandit relies.
Protection of bandits may range from a close though narrow circle of kinsmen and affiliated friends to powerful politicians, including those who hold formal office as well as grass-roots politicians. Protection thus involves the presence of a power domain. Of all categories, the peasants are weakest. In fact, this is the main reason why they are peasants (cf. Wolf, 1966: 1-11; Landsberger, 1969: 1-8). It may hence be argued that unless bandits find political protection, their reign will be short. This yields the following hypothesis, which may be tested against data bearing on all kinds of robbery: The more successful a man is as a bandit, the more extensive the protection granted him. The second variable may be difficult to quantify, A similar orientation holds good for Giuliano's contemporary, Liggio, still today one of the most violent outlaws in western Sicily. The zone of terror which he established in the island region during the aftermath of the second world war was primarily aimed at the demobilization of the peasants who had just begun to organize themselves in order to attain agrarian reform.8
The Marxists have consistently argued that peasants require outside leadership in order to change their conditions.9 Bandits are not instrumental in turning peasant anarchy and rebellion (e.g. jacqueries) into sustained and concerted action on a wider scale. This is not, as Hobsbawm (1959: 5, 26) maintains, because their ambitions are modest and because they lack organization and ideology, but rather because their first loyalty is not to the peasants. When bandits assume retainership (either part time or full time) they serve to prevent and suppress peasant mobilization in at least 
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two ways: first, by putting down collective peasant action through terror; second, by carving out avenues of upward mobility which, like many other vertical bonds in peasant societies, tend to weaken class tensions. Though bandits are thus essentially conservative, politically speaking, there are none the less specific circumstances under which they may become effective in destroying an established regime. This is most likely to happen when they can rely on a promising, rival power which questions the existing power structure. The armed bands who had helped Garibaldi to unsettle Bourbon government in Sicily in 1860 are an example of the strategic role which bandits may fulfil in major upheavals. Even then, however, bandits may provide embarrassments since they may simply dissolve, change their allegiance upon the occasion, or fail to understand the situation in a wider context. 10 Though Hobsbawm describes the myths and legends about bandits, his two studies fail to penetrate them. Even when we admit that it is the urban middle class rather than the ordinary peasantry who idealize the bandit, we may well ask to whom or what the peasants refer when they glorify the bandit. Here we may follow Elizabeth Bott, who draws a distinction between direct and constructed reference groups. The former are groups in which the referent is an actual group: either membership or non-membership groups whose norms have been internalized by the individual. The latter concern groups in which the referent is a concept or social category rather than an actual group: 'The amount of construction and projection of norms into constructed reference groups is relatively high' (1964:167-8).
The 'social bandit' as conceptualized and described by Hobsbawm is such a construct, stereotype, or figment of human imagination. Though such constructs may not correspond to actual conditions, they are psychologically real, since they represent fundamental aspirations of people, in this case of the peasants. Successful bandits stand out as men who evolved from poverty to relative wealth, and who acquired power. To use a standard Sicilian expression, they are men who make themselves respected. The notion of honour as expressed in a person's successful control over resources by means of physical force is characteristic of Medieval European and contemporary Mediterranean societies. This concern with honour and the specific meaning attached to it are related to the relatively low level of State formation in these societies. In the absence of stable central control over the means of violence, people could not rely for protection on State institutions. With respect to sheer physical survival, they were largely de- pendent on their own, or on the protection of more powerful persons.1l Successful bandits inspire fear and respect. Hence the fascination they radiate, especially among those who are in no sense respected-the peasants, from whose ranks they usually emerge.
The element of social protest is expressed in the myth, which thus builds up around the bandit. This process, or at least part of it, is pictured very skilfully and with great subtlety in Francesco Rosi's film Salvatore Giuliano (1962) in which we see surprisingly little of the bandit himself. Indeed the very physical absence of outlaws from the ordinary day-to-day life facilitates the formation of myths and legends in which the bandit appears as a man fighting the rich to succour the poor. We idealize all the more easily those things and people with whom we are least acquainted, or whom we rarely actually see, and we tend to ignore information that is detrimental to a beloved image.12 Actual bandit life is often unpleasant and grim. It involves prolonged residence in humid caves and long toilsome marches as well as much and brutal action against numerous poor and helpless victims (e.g., Pereira de Queiroz, 1968: 112-22). Physical discomfort might be one reason why bandits seek to come to terms with their protectors in a more definite way, that is, when they assume the role of retainer. Many notorious delinquents and bandit leaders, like di Miceli and Scordato in mid-nineteenth-century Palermo, were given special charge of public security (Mack Smith, 1968: 419) . In Sicily this and similar avenues to 'respectability' are institutionalized in the mafia, on which brigandage largely depends. We must expect to find similar mechanisms in Sardinia, Spain, Mexico and the Philippines. 3 Like the bandit's real life, these conversions in which bandits turn into retainers and help to reinforce oppression of the peasantry do not provide attractive ingredients for myths and ballads.
Actual brigandage expresses man's pursuit of honour and power.14 This holds true for the bandit as much as his protector, who manipulates 14 Parker (1967: 135) points to the emphasis in the picaresque novel on self-assertion, the longing for 'respectability', and 'the will to power' as salient attributes of the delinquent. This orientation of bandits and mafiosi as well as the measure of political protection granted them is elaborated in a forthcoming publication (Blok, 1972) . him in order to extend his power domains. The myth of the bandit (Hobsbawm's social bandit) represents a craving for a different society, a more human world in which people are justly dealt with and in which there is no suffering. These myths require our attention. It has been argued that they are the institutionalized expression of a dormant protest element which, under certain conditions, may 'gather force and break through the culturally accepted patterns which kept it within its institutionalized bounds' 
